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Ferree: Protected Negligence--The Doctrine of Tort Immunity for Charities

NOTES
PROTECTED NEGLIGENCE-THE DOCTRINE
OF TORT IMMUNITY FOR CHARITIES
The doctrine of tort immunity for charities came into existence in South Carolina in 1914. In Lindler v. Columbia Hosp.1
the plaintiff was severely burned when, upon return from surgery in an unconscious state, she was lain on scalding hot water
bottles placed in her bed by an employee. Hot water bottles
were used to prevent post operative shock. The court, en banc,
in a case of novel impression in this state, held that in the absence
of negligence in retention of employees by the hospital there
could be no recovery. The court used public policy as its basis
to deny recovery by the plaintiff.2 Only two of the five justices
voted with the majority; the other three justices voted to hold
the hospital liable. The doctrine announced was not new; it
had been in existence in the United States since 1876. The doctrine, announced for the first time in Massachusetts, 4 began on
a shaky foundation, and its presence in modern law may be
attributed largely to the reluctance of courts to break with stare
decisis which, for purposes of the doctrine, has become iron-rigid
against change. The purpose of this note is to explore the doctrine from its inception to the present, the several theories for its
imposition, its exceptions, its inconsistencies and other criticisms, and its state at present in South Carolina.
A. History
The doctrine was imported to the United States from England via the case of McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., in
which the negligence of an intern resulted in the plaintiff's
injury. The court refused to impose liability saying that to subject the trust funds of the charity, derived from the contributions of the hospital's benefactors, to payment of damages would
be a misdirection of the trust funds from the charitable purpose. 6 The court relied on an English case, Holliday v. St.
Leonard,7 which relied on dicta from an earlier English case,
1. 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

4. McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep.
495 (1876).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. 11 C.B. (N.S.) 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
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Duncan v. Findkater,8 which had nothing to do with charities. Maryland, nine years after the Massachusetts' decision,
also used English precedent to support its announcement
of the doctrine.9 In Perry v. House of Refuge"0 the Maryland court relied upon dicta in an 1846 case, Feoffees of Heriot's
Hosp. V. Ross,11 to support its decision. Feoffees in turn also
12 The error committed by both
relied on Duncan v. Findlater.'
the Massachusetts and Maryland courts was that the English
precedents had all been overruled prior to their use by the two
American courts. Feoffees and Duncan were overruled in 1866
by Mersey Docks Trustees V. Gibls,18 and Holiday was over4 Hence
ruled in 1871 by Foremnan v. Mayor of Canterbury.1
before the infant doctrine was born in the United States the
English courts had found it unacceptable and had abandoned it.
Like the English courts the Rhode Island court also found it
unacceptable and rejected it in the early days,' 5 but an apprehensive legislature subsequently gave Rhode Island the doctrine
by statute,' 6 one of only two such statutes in existence at
7
present.1
Only four courts had specifically rejected this doctrine by
194:2.18 Even during this period, however, it is doubtful that a
19 and at present
majority of American jurisdictions adopted it,
20
it is the minority view. In 1942 Justice Rutledge, in President
8. 6 Clark & Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839).
9. Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1885).

10. Ibid.
11. 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

6 Clark & Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839).
11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866).
6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1-22 (1956).
17. KANs. GEN. ST.T. ANN. § 17-1725.
18. Florida, Minnesota, New Hampshire and Utah. Horty, The Status of

the Doctrine of CharitableInmunity it Hospital Cases, 25 OHio ST. LJ. 343,

353-59 (1964).
19. See Fisch, CharitableLiability for Tort, 10 VmT. L. REv. 71 (1964).

20. RESUME OF THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES BY JURISDICTION-"Third parties" refers to strangers, invitees, employees and any
other which would not fit into the category of a beneficiary. Since a study
of the area of immunity is primarily one of hospitals, "patient" is used to
indicate a beneficiary, except in the instances where (1) the jurisdiction
distinguishes between a paying patient and a non-paying patient and (2) in
jurisdictions which distinguish between hospitals and other charities as to
liability; in the first case "non-paying" or "charity patient" is used which
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also denotes beneficiary, in the second case "beneficiary" is used. See Horty,
The Status of the Doctrine of CharitableImmunity in Hospital Cases, 25 OHIo
ST. L.J. 343, 353-59 (1964).
ALABAMA-Alabama Baptist Hosp. Bd. v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So.
443 (1933) (third parties can recover); Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary, 191
Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) (paying patient can recover). No cases on nonpaying patients.
ALASKA-Moats v. Sisters of Charity, 13 Alaska 546 (1952) (no immunity).
ARIZONA-Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220
(1951) (no immunity).
ARKANSAS-Ax. STAT. Axnr. § 66-3240 (Supp. 1961) (direct action
against insurer).
CALIFORNIA-Molloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) (no
immunity).
COLORADO-St. Lukes Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917
(1952) (no immunity, but recovery can come from only assets not devoted to
charitable use).
CONNECTICUT-Cashman v. Meriden Hosp., 117 Conn. 585, 169 Atl.
915 (1933) (patients cannot recover); Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc'y, 113
Conn. 188, 154 AtI. 435 (1931) (third persons can recover).
DELEWARE-Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753
(1951) (no immunity).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (no immunity); President &
Directors of Georgetown College v. Heimbach, 251 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C.
1966).
FLORIDA-Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hosp., 65 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1953) (no
immunity).
GEORGIA-Cox v. De Jarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961)
(no immunity to the extent the charity has liability insurance, if it does have
insurance).
HAWAII-No cases.
IDAHO-Bell v. Presbytery of Boise, 421 P.2d 745 (Idaho 1966) (no
immunity).
ILLINOIS-Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d
326, 211 N.E2d 353 (1965) (no immunity).
INDIANA-St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924)
(patients cannot recover); Winona Technical Institute v. Stolte, 173 Ind. 39,
89 N.E. 393 (1909) (no immunity as to third persons).
IOWA-Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d
151 (1950) (no immunity).
KANSAS-KAxs. GFN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1725 (immunity by statute) was
held unconstitutional by Neely v. St. Francis Hosp., 192 Kan. 716, 391 P.2d
155 (1964), therefore reestablishing liability.
KENTUCKY-Millikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1961) (no immunity).
LOUISIANA-LA. RL. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (direct action against insurer).
MAINE-Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898
(1910) (immunity as to patients). No cases as to third parties.
MARYLAND-MD. ANN. CoDn art. 48A § 480 (1957) (direct action
against the insurer).
MASSACHUSETTS-McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass.
432, 21 Am. Rep. 495 (1876) (immunity to all).
MICHIGAN-Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1
(1960) (no immunity).
MINNESOTA-Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn.
392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920) (no immunity).
MISSISSIPPI-Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55
So. 2d 142 (1951) (no immunity).
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MISSOURI-Dille v. St. Luke's Hosp., 355 Mo. App. 436, 196 S.W2d 615
(1946) (immunity to all).
MONTANA-Howard v. Sisters of Charity, 193 F. Supp. 191 (D. Mont.
1961) (no immunity). No state court cases.
NEBRASKA-Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W2d 852 (1966)
(no immunity).
NEVADA-Nv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.480 (1961) (no immunity by
statute).
NEW HAMPSHIRE-Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hosp., 90 N.H. 337,
9 A.2d 761 (1939) (no immunity).
NEW JERSEY-Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141
A.2d 276 (1958) (no immunity). But N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A §§ 53A-7 to
-11 limits recovery to no more than $10,000.
NEW MEXICO-Deming Ladies' Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, 276 Fed. 668 (8th
Cir. 1921) (immunity to all). No state cases.
NEW YORK-Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 2 (1957) (no
immunity).
NORTH CAROLINA-Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., 152 S.E.2d 485
(N.C. 1967) (no immunity where charity is a hospital). Cowans v. North
Carolina Baptist Hosp., 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (1929) (no immunity to
third parties); Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807 (1914) (immunity
as to beneficiaries).
NORTH DAKOTA-Rickbiel v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525,
23 N.W.2d 247 (1946) (no immunity).
OHIO-Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E2d 410
(1956) (no immunity where charity is a hospital, immunity otherwise).
OKLAHOMA-Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Old. 687, 100 P2d 244 (1940)
(no immunity as to third parties) ; Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okl. 454, 82 P.2d 996 (1938) (no immunity as to paying patients).
No cases as to charity patient.
OREGON-Hungerford v. Portland Sanitariam & Benevolent Ass'n, 235 Or.
412, 384 P.2d 1009 (1963) (no immunity).
PENNSYLVANIA-Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208
A.2d 193 (1965) (no immunity).
RHODE ISLAND-R.I. GEN. LAws AN. § 7-1-22 (1956) (immunity by
statute).
SOUTH CAROLINA-See text infra.
SOUTH DAKOTA-No cases.
TENNESSEE-McLeod v. St. Thomas Hosp., 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S.W.2d
917 (1936) (no immunity, but recovery limited to assets not devoted to
charitable purposes).
TEXAS-Total immunity reaffirmed by Watkins v. South Crest Baptist
Church, 399 S.W.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. Texas 1966).
UTAH-Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 94 Utah 460,
78 P.2d 645 (1938) (no immunity).
VERMONT-Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230
(1950) (no immunity).
VIRGINIA-Protestant Hosp. v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, 173 S.E. 363 (1934)
(immunity as to patients) ; Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116
Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914) (no immunity as to third parties).
WASHINGTON-Friend v. Cove Methodist Church, 65 Wash. 2d 174,
396 P.2d 546 (1964) (no immunity).
WEST VIRGINIA-Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp., 149 W. Va. 705, 143
S.E.2d 154 (1965) (no immunity).
WISCONSIN-Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131
(1961) (no immunity).
WYOMING-Bishop Randall Hosp. v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac.
385 (1916) (immunity as to patients). No cases as to third parties.
PUERTO RICO-Tavarez v. San Juan Lodge, 68 P.R.R. 681 (1948) (no
immunity).
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& Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes,21.wrote a lengthy,
well-reasoned and oft-quoted opinion which has subsequently
proved to be the major force in reversing the trend of the doctrine. Notwithstanding the fact that this was a dissenting
opinion 22 it has served as the major precedent against the
doctrine.
B. Theories for Imposition of the Doctrine
Traditionally the theories for the imposition of the doctrine
have been separated into four categories: (1) Trust fund theory,
(2) respondeat superior theory (the theory that respondeat
superior does not apply to charities), (3) implied waiver theory,
and (4) public policy theory.2 3 It is apparent that the states
in which the doctrine continues to survive cannot agree on one
particular theory to use in support of the doctrine. All, however, are in basic agreement why they feel the doctrine is valid;
namely, to hold otherwise would act to deplete the funds of the
charity. The summary below points out these theories and the
criticisms of each.
1. The Trust Fund Theory
The trust fund theory, the first used to support the doctrine,
24
was initially set out in McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.
It is basically the idea that payment of damages would be a
misdirection of the "trust funds" of the charity. Professor
Scott described the scope of the theory in its broadest, purest
form, saying:
Under this theory the exemption of the institution is
very broad. Under it a hospital, for example, is not subject
to liability, whether the negligence is that of the directors
or trustees or officers or that of its nurses or other employees; it is not subject to liability whether the person
injured is a patient, either a paying patient or charity
21. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
22. The opinion was'thq&opinion of the court; three of the six judges concurred in the result only. President & Directors of Georgetown College v.

Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
23. E.g., PRossER, ToRTs § 127 (3d ed. 1964) ; Fisch, supra note 19; Horty,
supra note 18. Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 163 (1966) ; Note, 32 TEmP. L.Q. 86 (1958).
Justice Rutledge also used the categories in President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810k (D.C. Cir. 1942).

24. 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 495 (1876).
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patient, or is a visitor or employee or a stranger, as for
example a person who is injured on the sidewalk in front
25
of the hospital or a person who is struck by an ambulance.
The philosophy behind this theory is that property devoted to
charitable purposes should not be diverted to the non-charitable
purpose of paying damage claims, for it would deplete the funds
of the charity and would, therefore, impair or destroy the object
of the hospital's benefactors, and further, would discourage
contributions because the benefactors would not contribute if
they knew the funds would go to pay damage claims. 26
The transparencies of this philosophy are obvious and there is
no support for it at present. There has been no noticeable impairment of charities subjected to payment of damages in those
27
jurisdictions without the doctrine.
One weakness of the theory has been stated:
[I]n the fact that it is contrary to the various decisions
which have evolved methods of making other trust funds
responsible for torts committed in administering the trust,
and that since such funds would not be exempt in the hands
of the donor himself, he can scarcely have the power, even
if it were ever true that he had even the intention, to confer
such immunity upon the object of his bounty. [Further]
it proves too much, and is inconsistent with the numerous decisions which have held charities liable for damages
28
for breach of contract, and for some kinds of negligence.
Some of the other suggested criticisms of the theory are:
(1) As far as defeat of the settlor's intent is concerned he should
expect his trust to bear its own expenses and burdens, and, if
not, then perhaps the law should not allow his intention to be
carried out; (2) the possible discouragement of donations because of liability does not balance favorably with an uncompensated wrong done a person who is without fault; (3) there
will probably be no other chance for compensation since the
employees are generally judgment proof; (4) immunity tends
25. Scorr, ABRaIDGEENT OF TRUSTS § 402 at 731-32 (1960).
26. BoGERT, TRusTs 336-39 (4th ed. 1963); Note, 20 Sw. LJ. 163 (1966).
See e.g., Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 AtI. 898
(1910).
27. President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
28. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1020.
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to foster careless conduct by the charity; and (5) the public
interest in seeing that an injured party is compensated outweighs the social advantage of assuring the funds of a charity
29
are not depleted.
The Restatement of Trusts in the original publication stated
that the charity was immune, 30 but in the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts the position has changed and there is a disavowel of
any immunity under the trust fund theory.81 Professor Scott
says the immunity under this theory is clearly against public
policy and continues that a trust should "be just before it is
generous. 32
2. Respondeat Superior Theory
The theory that respondeat superior is not applicable to charities is based on the philosophy that since there is no profit
derived from the work performed by its employees the charity
should not be liable for the torts committed by them.38 Historically, profit was not the basis for respondeat superior; its
basis was not so narrow. It arose from the right of the master
to select, direct and control the servant in his endeavors for the
master. The courts, however, apparently found the pull of
immunity stronger than that of the well-established doctrine of
respondeat superior and consequently established this exception
to the doctrine.3 4 It appears that courts fashioning this exception to respondeat superior allowed the historical grounds for
it to become lost in an effort to find a satisfactory basis on
which to rest the doctrine of immunity. 5
3. Implied Waiver Theory
The implied waiver theory is founded upon the beneficiaries'
assumption of risk. When an individual accepts charity, he is
considered to have waived his right to hold the charity liable in
tort for any injuries he may sustain by the negligence of the
charity or its employees.8 6 This sounds very much like the
29. BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 26.
30. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 402 (1935).
31. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS §§ 247, 264, 278-79 (1959).

32. Scort, oP. ct. supra note 25, at 732.
33. Ibid; Note, 20 Sw. LJ. 163 (1966).
34. Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 163, 164 (1966).
35. See Fisch, supra note 19.
36. E.g., Powers v. Massachusetts Homoepathic Hosp., 109 Fed. 294 (1st

Cir. 1901).
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beneficiary has assumed the risk of accepting charity; it is
hardly palatable that one who enters a hospital for treatment
has assumed the risk of some danger of injury from the negligence of hospital employees. The patient enters the hospital because he needs better treatment than he could get at
home. If the average patient were aware of the fact that he was
assuming such risk, he might choose to stay at home. It is
hardly believable that one who enters a hospital for professional
care assumes the risk that he may be tortiously injured. The
implied waiver theory suggests that a charity may contract
away its duty of due care.
Other weaknesses of the theory are readily apparent. It constitutes a breach of the general rule that one may not contract
away his duty of due care. It also gives rise to questions of
enforceability as a contract; it ignores the prerequisites of
capacity to contract.3 7 It assumes a patient has the capacity to
make an enforceable contract whether he is a minor, an unconscious victim of an automobile accident, a person devoid of
mental competence, or a person who is so racked with pain that
he could obviously not act as a free agent. This would be captioned duress in ordinary contracting circumstances. Combining the ability of the charity to contract away its duty of due
care with the assumed capacity of the patient to contract, the
court finds an agreement through which immunity can be enforced. Such an agreement which is questionable in contract
law and clearly against public policy is unconscionable.
4. Public Poliay Theory
This theory is simply that it would be against public policy
to allow recovery for damages which would thereby impede the
ability of the charity to carry on its work. It is better for the
individual to suffer than for the public to endure the loss of
the services rendered by the charity. 8 Behind this theory are
three suggested sub-theories which have been used to support
it.8D The first, that the exemption from liability allows the
funds to be concentrated on the charitable purpose, sounds like
and has its roots in the trust theory, and the criticisms of the
trust fund theory are generally applicable. The second, that the
37. E.g., Gamble v. Vanderbilt Univ., 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510 (1917).
See Note, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 86 (1958).
38. Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 163, 164 (1966).
39. The theories are suggested in Fisch, supra note 19.
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donor would not have contributed if he had known his contributions would be used to pay damages, does not hold true. There
is no evidence that charities lose contributors in liability states
because the charity is held responsible for its failure to exercise
reasonable care. 40 The donative intent is to benefit others by
the donor's benevolence; it is not limited only to those helped
by the charity. As suggested before, if the intent is so limited
it may be unwise for the law to allow the donor's intention to
be carried out. 41
The third sub-theory, that the payment of damages would
destroy the charity, may have been justifiable in 1876, but it is
not now. It fails to recognize the change that has swept the
area of charities since the inception of the doctrine of immunity.
The days of the log cabin charity are gone. The list of contributors is no longer made up solely of well-meaning private
citizens; governmental and foundation grants are among the
major sources of revenue to fund the charity.42 It can hardly

be said that a payment of a judgment for damages would place
the charity in irreparable financial straits at present.
5. Summary
Obviously the courts using these theories are "mingling their
assets." It is not unusual to find a court using two of the
theories; the Massachusetts court used the trust fund and public
policy theories43 and another used the public policy and
respondeat superior theories. 44 Arguably the only difference between public policy and respondeat superior is in name only. 45
Neither holds the master liable for the tort of the servant; the
one says that public policy prevents liability, the other says
respondeat superior does not apply in order to protect the public
good. The essence of both of these theories is protection of the
public good. The public good also underlies the trust fund and
waiver theories. As a result it is apparent that all courts have
found a supposed public good in fostering the doctrine, but,
40. PRossER, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1021.
41. BOGET, op. cit. supra note 26.
42. E.g., Knecht v. St. Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1950) (dissenting opinion). See Fisch, supra note 19.
43. McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep.

495 (1876).

44. Vermillion v. Women's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649
(1915).
45. See Note, 32 TEmP. L.Q. 86 (1958).
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unable to agree upon a single basis, they have fabricated a fictitious trust device, a misapplication of respondeat superior,
a questionable contract theory (waiver), and the judiciallylegislated public policy in an attempt to support the doctrine
of immunity.
C. Iwonsistewies in the Application of the Doctrine
Applications of the doctrine have been diverse and at times
inconsistent. The courts in the jurisdictions where the doctrine
continues in existence have expanded the exceptions to the application of the doctrine to the extent that the exceptions are the
rule and the rule is the exception. Even the states with the most
rigid doctrine allow exceptions in application. An exception
is allowed, for instance, when the charity has been negligent in
the selection and retention of employees. 48 Some states differentiate between the beneficiary and third persons (strangers,
invitees, employees), permitting recovery of damages by the
latter.4 7 48 Others differentiate between paying and charity
patients.
The third person beneficiary distinction cannot be justified
under any of the theories except waiver. Under the other theories payment of damage claims to third persons is a misdirection of the trust funds and a depletion of the assets just as
payment to a beneficiary would be.4 9 This creates an exception
to the applicability of the respondeat superior theory. Further,
why should an employee be allowed to recover while the beneficiary cannot? The employee owes his livelihood to the charity;
who owes more, 5 0
If the doctrine of immunity is applied solely to patients in the
area of charitable hospitals it is manifestly unfair to the paying
patient, for it could not be contended that one who pays for all
the services rendered by the hospital is a recipient of charity. 51
It is also indefensible as applied to the indigent who is unable
46. E.g., Morton v. Savannah Hosp., 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918);

McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 495

(1876) ; Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).

47. Compare Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc'y, 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435

(1931) with Cashman v. Meriden Hosp., 117 Conn. 585, 169 Ati. 915 (1933).
48. E.g., Morton v. Savannah Hosp., supra note 46 (by implication).

49. President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810,
823 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
50. Id. at 825-27.
51. Horty, mipra note 18, at 346-47.
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to pay; he has no choice in the matter. He, above all, cannot
bear the burden of an uncompensated injury and should be the
first to recover. Of all persons he is the one the benefactor
would desire to have protected by indemnification for the carelessly inflicted injury.5 2 In a society that emphasizes rights of
the individual, the charity patient becomes an unfortunate exception to the modern maxim that the protection of an individual's rights should not depend upon his financial condition.a
Some states allow recovery by the injured party when the
charity has liability insurance.54 However, what seems to be an
important weakening of the doctrine becomes, through analysis,
something less than a major exception. The charity may prevent any recovery by simply not purchasing liability insurance.
Even if the charity is sufficiently benevolent to purchase insurance it may exclude any group from coverage, whether invitee,
employee, stranger, or beneficiary. 5 5 As a result when statutes
in some states read that the injured has a direct action against
the insurer, and go on to estop the insurer from using the
defense that the insured had charitable immunity, 56 the effect
is negligible. Even in states without such legislation some courts
permit recovery via insurance. None of these states requires the
charity to purchase liability insurance.
Another exception to the immunity of the charity is that the
charity is liable when an injury results from negligence in the
conduct of a commercial enterprise owned by the charity. If the
charity operates, for example, a parking lot 57 or office building58 or some other profit-making enterprise5 9 divorced from
the charity and an injury is suffered through negligent opera52. President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810,
827 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
53. Note, 32 Taap. L.Q. 86, 90 (1958).
54. Cox v. De Jarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961); Luse v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App. 1941). See Anx. STAT.
A N. § 66-3240 (Supp. 1961) ; LA. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (Supp. 1963);
MD. ANx. CoD- art. 48A, § 480 (1957).
55. Ramsey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 356 S.W.2d 236 (Ark. 1962)
(plaintiff, an employee, could have recovered if the insurance policy had not
excluded employees from its coverage).
56. See statutes cited note 54 supra.
57. Eiserhardt v. State Agricultural & Mechanical Soc'y, 235 S.C. 305, 111

S.E2d 568 (1959).

58. Blatt v. Geo. H. Nettleton Home for Aged Women, 365 Mo. 30, 275

S.W2d 344 (1955).

59. E.g., Grueninger v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 343 Mass.
338, 178 N.E.2d 917 (1961) (student insurance plan).
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tion of that enterprise, the charity is liable. Similar to this is
the exception that a charity is not immune to judgment of
damages, but the property and funds devoted to the charity are
not subject to payment of damages.60 In both of the above
exceptions the non-charitable assets, property or enterprise
which are used to produce funds which are used by the charity
to carry on its work are subject to payment of damages. The
argument that these are not funds or property devoted to the
charity but are somehow separate and do not come under
immunity is of doubtful merit. The "profits" are merely another source of contribution to the charity; they are part of the
funds and property devoted to the charitable purpose and belong
within the coverage of immunity if it exists.
A final exception to the doctrine is allowed when the charity
creates a nuisance which damages neighboring property. Thus,
where a charity has been involved in a trespass to land, the
charity has been held liable. 1 Realistically, to allow the doctrine to obtain here would be to greatly extend immunity, but,
technically, this is also another exception to the doctrine, and
tends also to reduce the effect of immunity to piecemeal application. It gives the charity immunity to only certain select torts.
Related to this is an equitable remedy. It is apparent, even in
states that have the strict doctrine that when a charity is so
conducted as to become a nuisance to neighboring property, the
owners of the adjoining property may enjoin the continuance of
02
the nuisance.
A patient who has been injured through the negligence of a
charity may be partially compensated for his loss indirectly by
refusing to recognize the hospital bill. 6 3 Though full compensation for his injury may not be recovered, such negligent action
by the charity will reduce or cancel the patient's obligation to
the hospital. The details and importance of this exception are
explained in more detail under the section on South Carolina
law, to be considered next.
60. St. Lukes Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 24, 240 P.2d 917 (1952);
McLcod v. St. Thomas Hosp., 120 Tenn. 423, 95 S.W.2d 917 (1936).
61. Peden v. Furman Univ., 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930).
62. Scorr, op. cit. mtpra note 25 at 733.

63. E.g., Beverly Hosp. v. Early, 292 Mass. 201, 197 N.E. 641 (1935).
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D. The State of the Doctrine in South Carolina
The doctrine of immunity remains strong in South Carolina;
it was upheld as recently as 1966 in Decker 'v. Bishop of Charleston. 64 The charity was held immune even though it had liability
insurance. The court indicated it was bound by stare decisis, and
that if the doctrine was to be changed it should be done by
the legislature.6 5 This language is comparable to that of
several other state courts that had previously upheld the doctrine
and have subsequently overruled the doctrine by decision.6 6 As in
other jurisdictions the doctrine in South Carolina has reached
the "last ditch" defense. South Carolina, however, reached this
defense in 1948,67 and has continued to repeat it though it has
had opportunities to change it.68

The doctrine arose in South Carolina, as noted earlier, in
Lindler v. Columbia Hosp.69 Justice Fraser, dissenting, criticized the theories of the doctrine, and stated that charitable
immunity came from governmental immunity and that governmental immunity had been slackened by statute.7 0 Noteworthy here is that since only two of the five Supreme Court
justices voted for the doctrine, the doctrine may not have been
introduced by this case had the court not sat en banc; the
71
majority of the nine-to-six vote included seven circuit judges.
72
However, in Vermillion v. Women's College of Due ]West
the court reaffirmed the doctrine, and continued to explain that
its adoption was
upon grounds of public policy, which forbid[s] the
crippling or destruction of charities which are established
for the benefit of the whole public to compensate one or
64. 247 S.C. 317, 147 S.E.2d 264 (1966).

65. Ibid.
66. Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W2d 1 (1960); Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958);
Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 235 Or. 412, 384 P.2d
1009 (1963); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193
(1965); Friend v. Cove Methodist Church, 65 Wash. 2d 174, 396 P.2d 546
(1964). However, the New Jersey Legislature in a cautious moment enacted
a limit to the liability of a charity. NJ. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A §§ 53A-7 to -11
(liability limited to $10,000).
67. Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E2d 788 (1948).
68. Decker v. Bishop of Charleston, 247 S.C. 317, 147 S.E.2d 264 (1966).
69. 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
70. Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
71. Ibid.
72. 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1915).
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more individual[s] . . . for injuries inflicted by the negli-

gence of the corporation itself, or of its superior officers
or agents, or of its servants or employees. The principle is
that, in organized society, the rights of the individual must,
in some instances, be subordinated to the pubZic good. It is
better for the individual to suffer injury without compensation than for the public to be deprived of the benefit of
the charity.73
The court went on to say that this was an exception to the
respondeat superior doctrine, and though the tort-feasor himself
may be financially unable to respond in damages the law did
not undertake to provide a solvent defendant for every wrong. 74
This case involved an injury which occurred when a balcony fell
on the decedent while he was attending a function at a college. 75
This case is significant because it expands immunity to cover
strangers as well as beneficiaries.
Gaughman v. CoMumbia Y.M.C.A. 76 further expanded the
doctrine to provide immunity where an employee was the injured party.77 There is significance here also because this decision established a charity as an exception to the workmen's
compensation laws. 78 The opinion, by Justice Oxner, exhibits a
strong impression that the charity should be liable, but the
court resigned itself to relying on the legislature to make such
70
a change.
The doctrine reached its most extreme application in the
Western District Federal Court when a rural electric cooperative was given charitable immunity. 0 This error was shortlived; the decision was reversed on appeal.8 ' Shortly thereafter,
in Bush v. Aiken Elec. Co-op., 2 Justice Oxner, again speaking
for the court, stated that the fact that an enterprise was nonprofit did not make it a charity.8 The opinion again ques73. Id. at 201, 88 S.E. at 650 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 197, 88 S.E. at 649.
75. Ibid.
76. 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788 (1948).
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., 118 F. Supp. 868 (D.S.C.), rev'd, 215
F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1954).
81. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., 215 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1954).
82. 226 S.C. 442, 85 S.E.2d 716 (1955).
83. Ibid.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss2/3

14

Ferree: Protected Negligence--The Doctrine of Tort Immunity for Charities
1967]
NoTes

tioned the merits of the doctrine, but continued to insist that the
burden of change rested on the legislature. 14
The doctrine as it stands in South Carolina does have some
exceptions. The first was announced simultaneously with the
birth of the doctrine; it is administrative negligence in selection
and retention of employees.8 5 To illustrate, if the hospital hired
a nurse, and during her tenure until the time of the injury in
question she had a record of having committed negligent acts,
the hospital could be held liable for administrative negligence.
The hospital would also be liable if, at the time of the injury,
the employee tort-feasor were performing in a capacity without
the scope of her employment.
Another exception to the doctrine deals with the negligent
operation of a commercial enterprise by the charity. In Eiserhardt v. State Agricultural & Mechanical Soo'y 0 the court said
that even though the defendant was organized along the lines of
a charity (the court did not say whether defendant was a charity
or not) the fact that the defendant may be a charity would not
be a bar to liability; immunity did not extend to a commercial
87
enterprise operated by a charity, here a parking lot.

The final exception to the doctrine in South Carolina is that
liability is placed upon a charity for the creation of a nuisance.
In Peden v. Furman UniV.88 the court held the university, a
charity under the doctrine, liable for damages due to trespass
to neighboring property. The court said the eleemosynary
organization was liable because it cannot conduct itself in such
a way as to prevent others from the enjoyment of their own
89

property.

There is a possibility that the injury to the beneficiary may be
used in hospital cases, to some extent, to relieve the beneficiary's burden. In Mullins Hosp. v. Squires,9" a case involving governmental immunity rather than charitable immunity, the court allowed the negligent injury as a defense to the
hospital's suit for payment for services. While a counterclaim
for the injury would not lie, the court said that an action for
84. Ibid.

85. Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
86. 235 S.C. 305, 111 S.E.2d 568 (1959).
87. Ibid.
88. 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930).
89. Ibid.
90. 233 S.C. 168, 104 S.E.2d 161 (1958).
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recoupment would be proper."1 This should be applicable to
charities, and is supported by Massachusetts,92 which, with
South Carolina, is one of the few states that continues to follow
a relatively strict doctrine. The court explained that no answer
in recoupment was required to reduce the charity's claim in
quantum meruit; all the defendant needs to show is that the
plaintiff failed to perform the contract exactly. The plaintiff
must show that the work done is worth what it seeks, and the
defendant, by showing he was injured by the plaintiff, establishes that the plaintiff has not performed the contract properly.93 Although this provides nothing in the way of relief for
innocent injured parties who are not patient-beneficiaries, it
does aid the injured patient-beneficiary in that he is not burdened with paying for the services of the charity. Obviously,
the non-paying charity patient receives no benefit from this
indirect compensation.
E. Concusion
"[T]he immunity of charities is clearly in full retreat; and it
may be predicted with some confidence that the end of the next
two decades will see its virtual disappearance from American
law."0

4

Whether or not justifiable historically, the doctrine

is clearly without justification now. Granting immunity to
charities is comparable to granting it to large commercial
corporations; the modern charity is operated on the scale of a
large corporation."3 It no longer has only private benefactors;
the federal government and large foundations contribute generously to charities. The community fund drives, in which campaigns are carried on with business-like efficiency, provide
another fertile source of operating funds. Businesses and employers strongly encourage employees to give generously, 6 and
civic-minded members of the community enthusiastically work
to provide donations for the charity.
The major source of funds for hospitals is insurance. In 1958
it was estimated that half of the gross charges for hospital care
were paid by insurance benefits. Recent figures show that,
91. Ibid.
92. Beverly Hosp. v. Early, 292 Mass. 201, 197 N.E. 641 (1935). This case
involved a charitable hospital.
93. Ibid.

94. PROSSER,

TORTS § 127 at 1024 (3d ed. 1964).
95. Knecht v. St. Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958) (dissenting

opinion). See also Note, 32 TmP. L.Q. 86, 92 (1958).

96. Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 163, 170 (1966).
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of every one hundred Americans, seventy-one have hospital insurance, sixty-three have surgical insurance, and forty-three
have medical insurance coverage. Most dramatic is the climb
in number of people with hospital insurance; in 1941 only
twelve million were covered, while in 1958 the number had increased to one hundred twenty-three million.9 7
Another type of insurance also makes the doctrine unrealistic.
Liability insurance is available for the charity at reasonable
rates; the effect of payment does not appreciably deplete the
funds of the charity. 98 Some states, in no more than a token
effort to ease the doctrine, have given the injured a direct action
against the insurer; this practice is of little significance because
the charity is under no legal duty to purchase the insurance. 99
Other states have rejected or abolished the doctrine altogether,
which has in effect forced the charities to purchase insurance.
Even in states where the doctrine still exists charities have insurance in anticipation of the day when they will no longer have
the cloak of immunity to hide behind.100 The charity in Bishop
of Charleston for example, was insured.1 0 '
Significant as far as governmental aid to charities is concerned is that the Federal Government acts indirectly to support charities. The taxpayer is allowed as much as a thirty
percent deduction annually from income tax for contributions
to charity, and under the estate' 0 3 and gift tax laws' 04 the
testator or donor has no limit on what may be bequeathed or
given to a charity tax-free. These tax benefits are also found
in state laws. 0 5
The doctrine of immunity violates the general law of torts' 0 6
and the doctrine of respondeat superor. It is clearly inconsonant with donative intent. It tends to foster negligence' 0 7 and
97. Ibid; Note, 32 TFmP. L.Q. 86, 92 (1958).

98. President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810,

823-24 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See also Note, 32 TEwP. L.Q. 86, 93 (1958).

99. See statutes cited note 54

supra, and accompanying text.

100. Note, 32 TEmp. L.Q. 86, 93 (1958).
101. Decker v. Bishop of Charleston, 247 S.C. 317, 147 S.E.2d 264 (1966).
102. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 170.
103. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055.
104. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2522.
105. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-259(10) (1962) (20% on income tax).
106. Note, 32 TEmP. L.Q. 86 (1958).
107. President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
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leaves the injured party with no remedy, as the tort-feasor is
generally judgment-proof. 08 It protects a charity well able
to afford payment of damages while placing the financial
burden on the individual who is most often the one least able
to bear it. Simply, it allows the charity to be generous without
being just.
The doctrine hangs by a final thread in several states where
the courts, though they created the doctrine by decision, remain
fearful of cutting the thread. The position that stare decisis
binds the court is clearly indefensible.
Stare decis channels the law. It erects lighthouses and
flies the signals of safety. Th ships of jurisprudence must
follow that well-defined channel which, over the years, has
proved to be secure and trustworthy. But it would not
comport with wisdom to insist that, should shoals rise in
a heretofore safe course and rocks emerge to encumber the
passage, the ship should nonetheless pursue the original
course, merely because it presented no hazard in the past.
The principle of stare deckis does not demand that we
follow precedents which shipwreck justice.'0 9
Stare decisis has not held up as a defense of the doctrine. To
illustrate, a recent North Carolina case 10 holding to stare decisis
cited seven jurisdictions"" in accord with it on the point of
stare decisis. Since the North Carolina decision five of the
seven jurisdictions found stare decisis not compelling 1 2 and
abolished the doctrine, and one enacted a statute giving direct
action against the insurer.118 Only one of these states continues
to rely upon stare decisis to uphold the immunity doctrine. 14
The doctrine, if it were ever justified, is out of pace with
modern law. The injustices of this crumbling anachronism in
108. BOGERT, TRUSTS 336-39 (4th ed. 1963).
109. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 510-11, 208 A.2d 193, 205

(1965).

110. Williams v. Randolph Hosp., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E2d 303 (1953). This

case was reversed as it applied to hospitals by Rabon v. Rowan Memorial

Hosp., 152 S.E.2d 485 (N.C. 1967).

111. The jurisdictions were Maryland, Massachusetts,
Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Washington.

Michigan,

New

112. See cases cited note 66 supra.
113. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 48A, § 480 (1957).
114. Massachusetts continues to follow the doctrine announced in McDonald
v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 495 (1876).
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the law continue in jurisdictions which honor stare decisis at the
expense of justice and fairness. It appears that, until the legislatures abolish or amend these short-lived, greatly criticized,
universally controversial, judge-made laws, the doctrine Will
remain. But hopefully, with the wave of cases abolishing the
doctrine despite stare decisis, the more reluctant courts will
soon follow suit.
Roy L. FnaER
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